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DIGRESSIONS FROM A DICTIONARY, 
OR 
A RAMBLE THROUGH THE PARKS* 
By Ronald Strahan 
In assembling this title, I have followed a fine nineteenth-century convention that 
permitted a cautious author to express his second thoughts; as in Charles Darwin's On 
the Origin of Species by means of Natural Selection, or the Prese11iation of Favoured 
Races in the Struggle for Life and in Dean Farrar's Eric or Little by Little, a Tale of 
Roslyn School. You will, I fear, discover that the imprecision of my title is apt; for I 
shall digress and ramble and, at best, you may find that my remarks have tenuous lexi-
cological links and that what I have to say about parks has some bearing upon our 
changing view of nature. 
Philologists have good grounds for postulating the past existence of a primitive 
West Germanic word approximating to parrack, a pen or enclosure, or the surrounding 
fence. Through Old High German pfarrih or pferrih and Middle High German pferrich it 
became the modern German Pferch, a (sheep) fold. In Old Proven~al we find parran, a 
walled garden and in Spanish, parra, originally the trellis or pergola and now the (grape) 
vine that grows upon it. Medieval Latin had parricus, later contracted to parcus, from 
which was derived the French parc with its modern meaning still with a strong connota-
tion of sheepfold or paddock. 
By the sixteenth century, the diminutive parquet, a small enclosure, had come to 
mean that part of a law court wherein the judges were segregated and by subsequent 
separate derivations the office of the public prosecutor; the police judiciaire; the bar of 
the court; and the board floor of the judicial enclosure, whence parqueterie, the making 
of such a floor, and English parquetry. One could follow parquet into the theatre and the 
stock exchange but that would lead us too far away from the fold. 
The English word, park, derived from the French parc, is first recorded from the 
thirteenth century when it had the meaning of an enclosed tract of land held by royal 
grant or prescription for stag-hunting. (It differed from a chase which served the same 
purpose but was not enclosed by a fence or hedge.) Formalized stag-hunting was a 
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Norman introduction, a royal or noble prerogative expressive of the contempt in which 
equestrian invaders tend to hold those who are tied to a location by the practice of agri-
culture. In this respect the Normans had much in common with the westward-moving 
Huns and the eastward-moving Mongols. Traditional marks of prestige die hard and 
hunting on horseback is still an expression of the status of the British aristocracy. 
A park was not a wilderness - except in the sense that it was uncultivated - nor 
was it a forest. Only open woodland and grassland were suitable on the one hand for the 
deer and, on the other, for mounted huntsmen. Forest and wilderness have seldom been 
high in human esteem. The evolutionary transition from ape-like ancestors to the first 
men involved a movement from forest to open country. As hunter-gatherers we found 
subsistence in the natural products of savannah and plains. As pastoralists we utilised 
and encouraged the extension of grasslands. As farmers we cleared the land completely. 
A professed love for wilderness is a recent phenomenon arising in Western Europe 
in relation to Naturphilosophie and the romantic movement at a time when almost all 
the non-urban land was under intensive cultivation or forest management. It was safe 
to express nostalgia for nature when it had all but disappeared. In nineteenth-century 
North America, still underpopulated and still with extensive virgin lands, it was, however, 
still possible to embrace the naturphilosophischen elements of romanticism with great 
sincerity: in this sense it seems to me that Thoreau was more to be respected than, say, 
Coleridge. Moreover, it may be noted that the national parks movement had its 
beginnings in the U.S.A. in the eighteen-seventies, well before any such action was con-
templated in Europe; although, as we shall see, the British movement against the 
enclosure of commons was somewhat comparable. 
In passing, one may compare the late-flowering nature-respect of Europe with the 
traditional nature-reverence of eastern Asia. While it seems that most cultures pass 
through a phase of nature-worship in which attempts are made to propitiate the environ-
mental elements to promote agriculture, this tends to disappear or to lose its relevance 
with the growth of civilisation. In China, however, early nature-reverence was 
incorporated into a complex civilisation, being codified and recodified in the philosophies 
of Confucius and his successors. In Japan, it lies at the base of Shinto. 
Yet, to an outsider such as myself, the end result is remarkably similar to the 
European romantic perversion. Neither the Chinese nor the Japanese really like nature. 
To the poet and artist, as to the landscape gardener, nature is a series of abstractions and 
symbols - of mountains, waterfalls, and trees in aesthetically appropriate relations. To 
them, as to the early European romantic (I include later generations of passionate 
explorers) nature in the raw is vulgar, to be shunned by gentlemen. 
To the first Australian visitors, Australian nature appeared unspeakably uncouth. 
Sometimes, admittedly, their lack of enthusiasm was justifiable: one can hardly object 
to the double superlative which Dampier felt compelled to use in description of the 
portion of Western Australia where he unfortunately landed; for it is 'the most 
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miserablest' place. But even the more fertile and hospitable regions rarely evoked pleasur-
able passions in the heart of a European beholder. 
The appropriate response of practical man was to subdue and transform the country: 
if one was of artistic inclination, the safest response was to ignore it. The interpretation 
of form by the eyes and brain is not inherent but learned in a cultural context. People 
who have been blind from birth due to opacity of their corneas and who, in adult life, 
suddenly have their eyes opened to the light by a corneal transplant, cannot see. The 
stimuli upon their retinas are the same as those upon ours but are without initial signif-
icance. Their brains have to be trained to the task of interpretation - a task so painfully 
laborious that some patients prefer not to undertake it: it is more comfortable to be 
blind. There is a comparable situation in art. 
Professional European artists became resident in Australia in the early nineteenth 
century but failed to see the country. Most of it is harsh, the light is bright; the trees 
irregular in shape, and the grass greyish. These stimuli impinged upon the retinas of our 
early artists but they organised the trees into compact masses, transformed the coarse, 
grey grasses into green lawns, and arranged the landforms to conform with the golden 
mean. They confronted bushland and painted it as romantic parkland, lacking only 
truncated Roman pillars or the ruins of a mediaeval abbey to give their pictures 
unquestionable respectability. Buvelot, who is commonly regarded as the founder of the 
Australian school of painting, was an incurable romantic, suffering to the end of his life 
from European myopia. Even by the end of the nineteenth century, when Roberts, 
Conder, Streeton, and their pupils were able to depict the elements of the Australian 
landscape on canvas with reasonable accuracy, their compositions were strongly tinged 
with European romantic imagery. 
And what has this to do with parks? I suggest that what the artist sees (or thinks he 
sees) and the values that he places upon what he depicts, condition our vision and our 
values. Did we ever see ghost gums prior to Namatjira or country pubs before Drysdale 
introduced them to us? 
Laboriously I come to the point that if men of self-confessed sensitivity could not 
begin to see Australian nature until about seventy or eighty years ago, it is not surprising 
that we ordinary people neither saw it nor felt any interest in preserving it. 
Let me digress again on values and attitudes. In Victorian and Edwardian times, 
industrial expansion was associated with great advances in science. It was reasonable to 
believe - and many reasonable people did believe - that we were close to absolute power 
over nature and approaching an understanding of all its princirJles. Power was good and 
if power involved spewing smoke, soot, and sulphuric acid over city and country-side, so 
be it. If it led to choking pea-soup fogs, these were a minor inconvenience: Londoners 
were perversely proud of their fogs and Turner made art of them. 
Until recently, New Yorkers were proud of the sunless canyons created by their 
skyscrapers and there are many Sydney siders today who - while recognising that their 
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city is growing uncontrollably like a cancer and, like a cancer, is strangulating its lines of 
supply and communication -- nevertheless take pride in the number of construction 
cranes on its skyline. 
Mainland conservationists going to Tasmania to encourage opposition to the flooding 
of Lake Pedder were disappointed by the reaction of the average Tasmanian who is in 
favour of more and bigger hydro·electric schemes. Taking pride in Great Lake and other 
inundations, he builds his holiday shack on the shore overlooking the skeletons of 
drowned trees. We do not all love the same things as Dorothea Mackellar. 
I certainly do not. When I was a zoo director, many people remarked to me that I 
must love animals and my reply was that I did not but that I tried to respect them. This, 
I believe, is the direction in which our view of nature is moving: towards a respect which 
recognises the right of a species to exist, simply because it is there - not because 
somebody happens to like or to love it. This is yet another digression and I must return 
to the dictionary. 
By the sixteenth century, park could mean a field or paddock, the word paddock 
having come from the English dialectical parrock, cognate with the hypothetical 
primitive German parrack with which we began. By the seventeenth century it had also 
come to mean an enclosed piece of land for public use. It thus approached the concept 
ofacommon. 
In the middle ages, and earlier, the basis of land division in southern Britain was the 
vill, often corresponding with a parish and having agreed borders with neighbouring 
vills. (Parish, by the way, is not in the family of words derived from parrack: it comes, 
via Latin, from the Greek para, alongside, and oikos, dwelling place.) Within the vill, 
the arable land was divided into fields, each householder of the vill owning and working 
a strip, or strips, of land in each field. Non-arableland was allocated to sheep pasturage 
and what was left over - essentially the wasteland - was deemed to be common land for 
the use of all households. 
An ecologist, Garrett Hardin, has recently popularised the concept of "the tragedy 
of the commons", based on the reasonable argument that a resource to which all have 
access is bound to be overutilised, since the gain to the man who, for example, puts an 
extra cow onto an already over-grazed common is more than the consequent loss (which 
is shared by all the users of the common). It is a valid concept but it happens not to be 
applicable to the commons of mediaeval England. 
The common offered coarse grazing, rough timber, firewood, and sometimes turf 
and game - renewable resources which were exploitable only within strong customary 
rules. The number of cattle that a householder might turn onto the common in summer 
might be no greater than he could feed from his own strips in winter, nor might he take 
more fuel than he could reasonably burn on a single hearth. I do not suggest that the rules 
were everywhere the same, that they were always respected, or that they were uniformly 
successful as conservation measures - merely that they constituted the framework of a 
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system that seems to have worked for centuries in a period of rather slow growth of the 
rural population. 
A communal approach to land use was not acceptable to the Norman conquerors. 
Each overlord sought direct control of all the lands in his fief and, while he could not 
always directly expropriate the villages, he saw no reason not to take over the commons. 
What I find surprising is that he invoked legal means rather than force majeure. 
The Statute of Merton (1235) permitted 'the great men of England' to make their 
profit of their lands, wastes, woods, and pastures, provided that sufficient was left to 
satisfy the needs of their tenants. Needless to say, tenants and landlord seldom agreed 
on what was 'sufficient' but, in law if not in practice, the onus was on the expropriator 
to demonstrate that he had not taken too much. He had, as it were, to make an environ-
mental impact statement; a gesture which could be as empty in the thirteenth century as 
in the twentieth. 
The Second Statue of Westminster (1285) went further and permitted the land of a 
manor to enclose common land for his own farming use, for sheep-grazing, or for hunting 
(in other words, to create a park). 
Conscious that this cursory treatment of complex matters may enrage historians and 
lawyers and rather than get in any deeper, I pass over some five centuries during which 
millions of acres of common land were enclosed to become the personal property of a 
lord, although still subject, in many instances, to the vestigial foraging rights of 
neighbouring households. In the eighteenth century, the rate of enclosure skyrocketed: 
all that was required to effect an enclosure was the passage of a private member's bill in 
the House of Commons. 
Around the middle of the nineteenth century, strong opposition arose to continuance 
of the process. This is not to suggest that there had been no opposition over the previous 
six centuries but rather that this had been too widely and thinly spread: the handful of 
villagers affected by a particular act of enclosure could not effectively make their voices 
heard in the British parliament. The new, organised opposition came from the upper 
middle classes in the cities, people whose political interests were not very different from 
those of the enclosers but who were nevertheless upset by the loss of the last of England's 
open country. Although their interest may well have been an expression of the romantic 
movement, the argument put forward was utilitarian; that recreational access to green 
countryside was essential to the health of the urban working class. 
The forces of oppOSItion to enclosures coalesced into the Commons Preservation 
Society, led by gentlemen who constituted a powerful parliamentary lobby. The first 
fruit of their efforts was the 1866 Metropolitan Commons Act, which prohibited 
fmiher enclosures within lhe Greater London area. 
It WilS not immediately effective. Lords of manors within the area, strongly 
mativated to obtain land for suburban development, pressed on with their enclosures, 
G\ 
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quoting the old Statutes of Merton and Westminster in justification. Under guidance from 
the Commons Preservation Society London citizens responded by resurrecting their rights 
of access to, and utilisation of, common land - rights which had not been exercised for 
centuries. In a classic test case, fourteen London lords, land-developers rather than 
farmers, became locked in a court battle with the Corporation of London over their right 
to enclose Epping Forest. The Corporation was victorious. 
It is interesting to recall that, although the Commons Preservation Society claimed 
that common land should be preserved for public recreation and that this was for the 
greater public good, British courts could not accept this as a pertinent argument. The case 
of Epping Forest was decided essentially on the rights of householders adjacent to the 
commons versus those of the manorial lords and it was not until after the Second World 
War that a general public interest in land usage became recognised in British law. A 
recent decision of the High Court (Stow versus Mineral Holdings, 1977) suggests that we 
have some distance to go before the principle becomes established in Australia. 
I do not wish to give the impression that enclosures were always against the public 
interest. Many of the largest areas of unutilised land in England were enclosed long ago 
by royalty as hunting parks and, thanks to a lack of pressure upon the royal family to 
subdivide these for cash, the New Forest and Dartmoor, for example, are still in 
existence. I see a parallel here with the Commonwealth's occupation of the North and 
South Heads of Sydney Harbour. We may not like some of the edifices and shacks that 
the army and navy have erected there but, compared with the urban jumble that is likely 
to have developed if the land had been under State control, these are insignificant 
blemishes. As a lazy occupant of the land, the Commonwealth has done the State some 
service. 
In another historical comparison, one may note that the anti-enclosure movement of 
the eighteen-sixties, like the conservation movement of the nineteen-sixties, originated in 
the cities rather than among the residents of the threatened areas; that it was powered by 
the literate middle-class rather than by the masses who allegedly needed the open spaces; 
and that the land in question was of little value for agriculture. 
By and large, only 'wastelands' have been available for preservation. The great 
expanse of Kruger National Park was put to its present use because the presence of 
tsetse flies rendered that part of Transvaal useless for cattle. Yellowstone, the world's 
first national park, was not desirable agricultural land nor - close to home - was the land 
now occupied by Royal, Kuringai, Blue Mountains, and Kosciusko National Parks. This 
is not to suggest that these parks could not now be utilised for grazing, forestry, mining, 
or suburban development; only that, at the time of proclamation, the areas had been 
worked over or passed over. 
In nineteenth-century England and in Australia until the nineteen-sixties, public 
parklands were established primarily for public recreation. Wastelands are often nicely 
fitted for this function, it being easy to construct meandering roads or tracks through 
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them, to erect swings, set:-saws; camping grounds and toilets, and to layout lawns and 
pools in the most frequented areas. Where an area is unsuitable for agriculture because of 
precipitous terrain, one has the bonus of scenic beauty. It is not uncommon for the 
greenies among us - academic or illiterate - to deride this concept of a park, yet it is in 
accord with one meaning of the term in the seventeenth century: an enclosed piece of 
ground of considerable extent, within or adjoining a city or town, ornamentally laid out, 
and devoted to public recreation; and to the mid-nineteenth century American meaning 
of an extensive area of land of defined limits set apart as a national property to be kept 
in its natural state for the public benefit and enjoyment. 
Over the past decade there has been a radical change in attitudes to parks. Among 
leaders of opinion, the cause of recreation has taken second place to conservation of 
nature. The change has been so rapid that it is hard to blame government for being 
confused and somewhat tardy in response. A minister points to the area of parkland 
added during his administration, reports with pride on the number of access roads and 
firebreaks constructed, and the information centres, toilet blocks, and barbecues erected: 
the conservationist replies, 'How terrible! Don't you realise that vistas destroy parks?' 
There was a time, perhaps as little as a century ago, when untouched, unexplored 
areas of this planet were of sufficient size and diversity to support most of the species of 
plants and animals that had survived the last Ice Age. Some had a rather precarious hold. 
Wolves had virtually vanished from western Europe and the lions that prowled the plains 
of classical Greece and Persia were now restricted to north-western India. The bison of 
North America were fast disappearing; there was a bounty on the head of the Tasmanian 
'tiger'; and the delicate pig-footed bandicoot, rare on the banks of the Murray River, was 
soon to be as dead as the dodo. 
The human population was increasing and most people applauded. It exploded and 
the remaining wilderness came under the axe and the plough. BiolOgists had been com-
plaining for a century but they were not heeded until the nineteen-sixties when, quite 
suddenly, a vocal middle-class urban minority realised that the only hope of retaining 
some fraction of the existing diversity of life lay in enclosing representative samples of 
wilderness and dedicating these, in perpetuity, as national parks or, ideally, as inter-
national parks. 
To retain diversity, we refrain from further encroachment - or we limit our 
encroachment - upon natural areas. On face, this seems a reasonable and straight-forward 
proposition but it is not simply implemented. There are few remaining natural areas of 
such size that they can support more or less stable animal populations. Mere enclosure 
does not guarantee their survival and maintenance often depends upon management of 
the fauna - culling certain species and actively encouraging others - in order to maintain 
the original diversity. Paradoxically, ironically, we may often have to intervene in order 
to maintain a state of nature. 
We have seen that the concept of a park, whether as a hunting-ground, a formal 
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garden, or a semi-wilderness, has always included its use by people. Yet, when a park is 
set up as a last refuge for native animals and plants, its use for public recreation must be 
strictly limited or even prohibited. Legislation for such restricted use is not popular. 
Supporters of the current conservation movement have varied motives and varying 
understanding of the issues involved. On the extreme left (Luddite or 'green') wing are 
those who are opposed, on principle, to industrial society; towards the centre are those 
who feel that a certain amount of nature is a good thing; the right wing includes people 
like myself who see no alternative to industrial civilisation but are distressed by our 
inability to conduct research upon Tasmanian 'tigers' and pig-footed bandicoots because 
farmers, graziers and foresters have destroyed the ecosystems upon which these animals 
depended. It is we of the right wing who are most concerned to erect people-proof 
reserves for the last of our wildlife, and it goes without saying that we - the very serious 
students of nature - expect special entry passes. 
Although their motives and interpretations differ profoundly, conservationists fmd 
themselves uniting in a movement towards a new ethic which would limit human rights 
and recognise, and grant, natural rights to natural entities. Can a river, a rain-forest, or a 
rat-kangaroo have legal rights in competition with those of a man? The question seems 
absurd but I doubt that it will to our children. They will have come to realise that man 
must co-exist with nature and that, while listening for whom the bell tolls, he needs must 
also mark the fall of every sparrow. We may indeed be on the way back to a reverence 
for nature - from which we evolved, upon which we depend, and to which our bodies 
eventually return. 
We could, with excellent lexicological justification, proceed in another direction. In 
the seventeenth century, park came to mean a space occupied by artillery wagons, beasts, 
and stores in a military encampment. From this concept of an artillery park is derived 
the modern car park. 
You pays your money and you takes your choice. 
